Economic Theory, Design and Behaviour Group
The research of the Economic Theory, Design and Behaviour Group focuses on the design and analysis of markets and other economic institutions, as well as economic experiments, behavioural game theory, models of bounded rationality and decision theory.
People
- Dr Claudia Cerrone
- Dr Xiaogang Che
- Dr Maria Cubel
- Dr Xeni Dassiou
- Dr Zahra Gambarova
- Dr Sotiris Georganas
- Dr Arina Nikandrova
- Dr Alessandro Sontuoso
- Dr Sergiu Ungureanu
- Professor Klaus Zauner
Xeni's research is in the field of Microeconomic Theory, specifically Industrial Economics, competition policy, as well as more recently working in the interface between market structure and finance
Sotiris' primary area of research until now has been in auction experiments, models of bounded rationality and applied game theory. In general Sotiris is interested in many, quite diverse areas of economics, ranging from experimental economics, game theory and bounded rationality to political economy, urban economics and trade.
Sergiu's main focus is microeconomic theory, with interests in decision theory and behavioural economics. He worked extensively on a classical rational decision theory account of behavioural observations like loss aversion and probability weightings, which are summarised in prospect theory. The goal is to use a bounded rationality mechanism which, when paired with other regular/classical assumptions, predicts the experimental biases observed.
Klaus' research focuses on explaining the observed behaviour in experiments that is at odds with standard economic theory using noisy payoffs and other-regarding preferences in classical strategic situations like ultimatum bargaining games or dynamic versions of the prisoners' dilemma. Recently, puzzled about issues of corporate asset stripping and tunnelling in transitional economies, he has started to investigate the impact of private benefits of control of managers on the investment behaviour of firms.
PhD students
- Anushree Parekh (supervisor: Dr A. Nikandrova)
- Lazaros Chatzilazarou (from September 2022, supervisors Claudia Cerrone, Sotiris Georganas)
- Karan Vishwanath (supervisors Xeni Dassiou and Saqib Jaffarey)
- Hantao Jiao (supervisors: Dr. Xiaogang Che and Professor Giulia Iori)
Past PhD students
Domile Butkeviciute, completed 2017,
- Title: "Consumer Preferences and Loyalty Discounts: The Case of the UK Grocery Retail Market".
- Supervisor: Dr Xeni Dassiou.
- First placement: KPMG (competition economics unit)
Publications
2024
Cerrone, C., Hermstrüwer, Y. and Kesten, O., 2024. School choice with consent: an experiment. The Economic Journal.
2022
D Cetemen, Can Urgun, Leeat Yariv Collective Progress: Dynamics of Exit Waves, Journal of Political Economy, Forthcoming
JC Schlegel, The Structure of Equilibria in Trading Networks with Frictions, Theoretical Economics, Volume 17 (2), pp 801–839, 2022.
Xiaogang Che, Hajime Katayama and Peter Lee, Product-harm crises and spillover effects: A case study of Volkswagen diesel emissions scandal in eBay used car auction markets, Journal of Marketing Research, Forthcoming
Xiaogang Che, Tilman Klumpp, Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed, Economic Theory, Forthcoming
Zahra Gambarova, Dionysius Glycopantis, "On two-player games with pure strategies on intervals [a,b] and comporisons with the two-player, two-strategy matrix case " Journal of Dynamics and Games, Volume 9 (3), p 299-322, 2022
2021
C. Cerrone, Doing it when others do: A strategic model of procrastination, Economic Inquiry, 2021
Xiaogang Che, Tong Li, Jingfeng Lu, and Xiaoyong Zheng, Deposit requirements in auctions, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Forthcoming
Xiaogang Che, Yangguang Huang, and Le Zhang, Supervisory eciency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy, Games and Economic Behavior, 2021
2020
D Cetemen, I Hwang, A Kaya, Uncertainty-driven Cooperation, Theoretical Economics, 2020 JC Schlegel, A Mamageishvili, Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 124, pp. 62-81, Elsevier, 2020.
Anderson, S.P. and Celik, L., Opaque selling, Information Economics and Policy, 2020.
2019
C. Cerrone and C. Engel, Deciding on behalf of others does not mitigate selfishness: An experiment, Economics Letters, 2019 M Karakaya, B. Klaus, JC Schlegel, Top Trading Cycles, Consistency, and Acyclic Priorities for House Allocation with Existing Tenants, Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 184, 104948, Elsevier, 2019.
Xiaogang Che, Hajime Katayama, Peter Lee, and Nan Shi, Warranty, seller reputation, and buyer experience: Evidence from eBay used car auctions, Journal of Industrial Economics, 2019. 2018 A Nikandrova and Pancs, R, Dynamic project selection, Theoretical Economics, 2018JC Schlegel, A Note on Ex-ante Stable Lotteries, Economics Letters, Volume 164, pp 90-93, Elsevier, 2018. 2017 A Nikandrova and Pancs, R, Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning, Journal of Economic Theory, 2017 X. Dassiou and D. Glycopantis, A note on the envelope theorem, 2017. 2016 Xiaogang Che, Tilman Klumpp, Entry deterrence in dynamic second-price auctions, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
2013-2016
2016
Celik, L., Competitive provision of tune-ins under common private information, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2016. 2015 Xiaogang Che, Brad R. Humphreys, Competition between sports leagues: Theory and evidence on rival league formation in North America, Review of Industrial Organization,
2015
Anderson, S.P. and Celik, L., Product line design, Journal of Economic Theory, 2015.Celik, L., Karabay, B. and McLaren, J., When is it optimal to delegate: The theory of fast-track authority, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2015.
2014
D Cetemen, E Karagozoglu Implementing Equal Division with an Ultimatum Threat, Theory and Decision, 2014Celik, L., Information unraveling revisited: Disclosure of horizontal attributes, Journal of Industrial Economics, 2014. Celik, L., A More General Framework to Analyze Whether Voluntary Disclosure is Insufficient or Excessive, Review of Industrial Organization, 2014.
2013
Georganas, S. (2013), 'Coalition Formation in a Legislative Voting Game' (with Nels Christiansen and John Kagel) (Aug 2011), in press, American Economic Journal (Microeconomics).
Georganas, S. (2011), 'English Auctions with Resale: An Experimental Study', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 73(1), pp.147-66.
Georganas, S. (2011), 'Asymmetric Auctions with Resale: An Experimental Study' (with John Kagel), Journal of Economic Theory, vol.146(1), pp.359-71.
Georganas, S. (2011), 'Auctions with Toeholds: An Experimental Study of Company Takeovers' (with Rosemarie Nagel), International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol.29(1), 2011, 34-45.
Zauner, K.G. (2013), 'Investment behavior and ownership structures in Ukraine: Soft budget constraints, government ownership and private benefits of control' (with D. Mykhayliv), Journal of Comparative Economics, vol.41(1), pp.265-78.
News and Events
13th Workshop on the Economics of Advertising and Marketing, City, 24-25 June 2022: In June 2022, the Economics Department at City hosted the 13th Workshop on the Economics of Advertising and Marketing.
City Economic Theory Workshop: In June 2022, the research center hosted a two day conference in Economic Theory
1st UK Matching workshop: In March 2020, the Economics Department at City hosted the 1st UK Matching Workshop